As the war ongoing in the Black Sea basin enters its fourth year, it continues unabated in its intensity. The concept of Nuclear Deterrence plays a key role in shaping such conflicts. Had Ukraine not returned the nuclear warheads it possessed to Russia, the situation on the ground would certainly have been very different.
Nearly every expert dealing with security issues in Munich agrees on this point and has expressed this view at least once. The process we are witnessing has once again proven that nuclear weapons constitute an absolute deterrent.
The Evolution of Nuclear Ambitions: From Iran to the NPT
If Iran is being targeted today, this should be interpreted not only in terms of energy resources but also through the lens of its proximity to acquiring an atomic bomb. Iran’s pursuit dates back to 1973. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, India’s and shortly thereafter Pakistan’s efforts to obtain the atomic bomb prompted the Shah of the time to act out of security concerns. Particularly during the Cold War years, having the Soviet Union as its northern neighbor made this decision unavoidable.
The CIA’s failed regime change attempts in 1977, followed by the weakening of the government and its overthrow in the 1979 revolution, gave rise to today’s geopolitical environment. Countries whose neighbors possess nuclear weapons have turned to such arms to safeguard their sovereignty. In the short term, they have preferred to remain under the umbrella of a country or pact that possesses these weapons.
This situation is often described as a mutual “win-win,” since the production and proliferation of this globally destructive power by additional countries could spell the end for all of us. For this reason, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to which Türkiye is also a party, was opened for signature in July 1968, entered into force in March 1970 during the height of the Cold War, and remains in effect today. The primary countries that did not join the treaty—Israel, India, and Pakistan—eventually acquired nuclear weapons, while North Korea, which withdrew from the treaty, has produced its own bomb. South Africa presents a different case; following efforts that began in 1974, it moved ten years later to produce the material for six atomic bombs. These bombs, stockpiled in disassembled kit form, were ultimately dismantled with the cancellation and termination of the nuclear program in 1991.
NATO’s Nuclear Shield and the Modernization Race
NATO is a nuclear alliance; member states make all their military capabilities available for joint use, including nuclear weapons (France’s situation is unique). For this purpose, U.S. B-61 atomic bombs stored in five European countries remain ready for use. Activated with the codes of the U.S. president and available for deployment by NATO air forces, these weapons are currently surrounded by uncertainty due to statements made by the Trump administration. Whether the notion of responding based on the degree and significance of an attack—outside previously defined scenarios—has altered the concept of the pact remains to be seen.
Moreover, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) has expired. Thanks to this treaty, which limited each ballistic missile to a single nuclear warhead, the number of nuclear warheads—61,000 during the Cold War—was reduced to 16,000 today; however, the wind now appears to be shifting. As China moves to increase its arsenal from 350 nuclear warheads to 1,000 within the next five years, Russia is developing its tactical nuclear weapons and introducing new-generation advanced ballistic missiles into service. The United States, meanwhile, is modernizing its intercontinental ballistic missiles, renewing all its tactical weapons, and rapidly upgrading the B-61 munitions to be used by F-35 aircraft.
While the status of nuclear mines and torpedoes remains unknown for now, the current state of “micro” weapons is entirely uncertain. Particularly concerning is the possibility that these micro weapons may have been pre-positioned and kept ready in various NATO countries without the need for delivery vectors.
A New Roadmap for European and Pacific Defense
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, in his statement at the Munich Security Conference (MSC), outlined a roadmap for European defense based on two pillars: rapidly increasing military equipment and ammunition, and creating an “autonomous” European component under the NATO umbrella that includes nuclear defense. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer emphasized in his speech that his country’s nuclear firepower continues to contribute to NATO defense as it has in the past and highlighted the importance of “nuclear coordination,” while French President Emmanuel Macron signaled that France’s nuclear weapons could serve “EU defense.” These are steps aimed at balancing Russia’s nuclear power should the United States retreat into the background. NATO Secretary General Rutte’s statements that “Europe cannot defend itself without the U.S.” and references to a “nuclear alliance” are also part of this broader picture.
At this juncture, a general overview is necessary. In the corridors of Munich, discussions frequently arise about Europe’s need for an alternative balance guaranteed by nuclear deterrence. While France displays a one-step-forward, two-steps-back approach on this matter, the UK proposes coordinated action. On the other hand, the United Kingdom’s weapons and Trident missiles are U.S.-origin, and France would require constitutional amendments for a transformation of its nuclear defense policy. They may offer a short-term solution, but in the medium term, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Canada could turn toward developing their own nuclear weapons.
The situation in the Pacific is even more troubling. In response to China’s rapid armament, Japan and South Korea may, in the medium term, choose to acquire their own atomic bombs as symbols of sovereignty. If other capable countries join this competition in a chain reaction, how many nations will have added this weapon to their inventories by 2040 remains a major question mark. Provided raw materials can be secured and political will formed, acquiring an atomic bomb is not inherently difficult; while information about its chemistry is even accessible online, the crucial factors are technical expertise and trained specialists.
The Future of Global Proliferation and the 2040 Horizon
Approximately 50 countries across Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific—Ukraine foremost among them—could possess this capability in the medium term. Transforming this capacity into an operational weapon in their inventories would pave the way for its use on the battlefield. We must remember the crisis atmosphere created by the Cuban blockade of November 1962 and avoid returning to those days.
The United States under President Trump has triggered a chain reaction that previous presidents would not have dared to initiate. Everyone attending the Munich Security Conference is uneasy about the situation, and halting the trajectory is becoming more difficult with each passing day. Although the U.S. officials we spoke with express confidence that economic and military sanctions will keep the situation under control, we will continue to monitor developments closely.
We must not forget the words emphasized by French philosopher Albert Camus after the detonation of two atomic bombs in Japan 80 years ago:
“Mechanical civilization has just reached its ultimate degree of savagery.”
SOURCE: C4Defence
